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Sequential effects are ubiquitous in experimental psychology. Within visual
search, performance is often speeded when participants search for the same target
twice in a row, as opposed to two different targets. Here, we investigate such
intertrial priming. Two experiments show that factors influencing search processes
affect the presence and size of intertrial priming: It is larger when there are fewer
elements in the visual display, and larger when there is a salient distractor present
than when the target is the only salient element in the display. A control experi-
ment showed that these increased priming effects were not due to longer baseline
RTs. These findings, it is argued, are inconsistent with theories that explain
intertrial priming as resulting from either only faster visual selection, or from
episodic retrieval of responses. Instead, we propose that ambiguity in the stimulus
or task underlies the occurrence of intertrial priming.
Sequential effects are ubiquitous in experimental psychology. People will react
faster on a given trial when they repeat the same movement as on the previous
trial (Bertelson, 1961; Goolsby & Suzuki, 2001; Soetens, 1998), when they
perform the same task (Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003), when they respond
to a cue after the same time interval (Los, Knol, & Boers, 2001), when they see
the same word or picture (Pecher & Raaijmakers, 1999; Warren & Morton,
1982), when they encounter a stimulus at the same location (Maljkovic &
Nakayama, 1996), when they search for the same target stimulus (Maljkovic &
Nakayama, 1994; MuÈller, Heller, & Ziegler, 1995), or search for a different
target but in the same distractor configuration (Chun & Jiang, 1998).
Within visual search, reaction time (RT) benefits have been observed when
the same target has to be found on two successive trials (Hillstrom, 2000;
Huang, Holcombe, & Pashler, 2004; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994, 2000;
MuÈller et al., 1995; Olivers & Humphreys, 2003). Maljkovic and Nakayama
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(1994) were the first to show that these benefits occur even for targets that, in
their words, ``pop out'' of the display. In their experiments, target diamonds
could be green among red diamonds, or red among green diamonds. If the target
had the same colour on two consecutive trials, observers were some 60±100 ms
faster than when the target colour switched. This ``priming of pop-out''
phenomenon (POP), as the authors called it, has been shown to be relatively
short-living (as a 90 s interval between consecutive trials negated it; Maljkovic
& Nakayama, 2000), but it is nevertheless a robust phenomenon (Found &
MuÈller, 1996; Goolsby & Suzuki, 2001; Kumada, 2001; McPeek, Maljkovic, &
Nakayama, 1999; MuÈller, Reimann, & Krummenacher, 2003). Similar intertrial
priming effects have also been found for targets that do not pop out (Hillstrom,
2000; KristjaÂnsson, Wang, & Nakayama, 2002).
Most researchers agree that intertrial priming reflects automatic, implicit
mechanisms. For instance, Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994; see also Hillstrom,
2000; Olivers & Humphreys, 2003) showed that the intertrial priming effects can
go back as far as eight trials. It is unlikely that observers consciously base their
search strategy on these distant trials. Indeed, Maljkovic and Nakayama (2000)
have shown that observers hardly remember what they saw on the immediately
preceding trial. In another experiment of Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994),
observers could explicitly expect a switch trial (because they alternated regu-
larly with same trials). This did not eliminate the costs associated with switch
trials, indicating that intertrial priming effects could not be overcome by top-
down settings. Other convincing evidence comes from a study of Theeuwes,
Reimann, and Mortier (in press). They used cues showing one of two possible
target shapes. However, each shape cue predicted with 80% validity that the
other shape would be the target. Nevertheless responses were faster in the 20%
of trials in which a cue was followed by itself as target. This suggests that the
cue led to bottom-up, automatic priming, and that such priming is difficult to
influence by top-down expectancy.
Apart from the implicit nature of the effect, there is little consensus on what
causes intertrial priming. One group of accounts, which we will collectively
refer to as the visual selection view, stresses the perceptual and attentional
nature of the priming effect. Maljkovic and Nakayama (2000, p. 592) propose an
``implicit yet primitive system [that] can facilitate the return to recently attended
targets and locations'', and ``ensure that objects of recent interest would be
repeatedly sampled''. According to MuÈller and colleagues (Found & MuÈller,
1996; MuÈller et al., 1995), visual selection is modulated by dimension-specific
salience signals. If a target in trial t is defined by a feature on one dimension
(e.g., colour), its associated attentional weight will increase at the expense of
other dimensions (e.g., orientation). This will make subsequent targets that pop
out on that dimension easier to detect, leading to a priming effect. Evidence
from single-cell recordings in monkeys is consistent with the general idea that a
target can become more salient through intertrial priming. When monkeys make
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eye movements to a colour singleton, neural responses in the frontal eye fields to
the singleton are larger when its colour remains the same as in the previous trial,
than when target colour is changed (Bichot & Schall, 2002). In the same vein,
neural responses to distractors are attenuated when the distractor colour remains
constant, relative to when it changes. These effects are not very large, but they
do suggest that a repeated target colour in an odd-one-out search task becomes
more salient, and a distractor colour less so.
Recently, however, several theories have taken a different tack, mostly
because of evidence that repetition of features is not invariably beneficial. We
will refer to this group of theories as the response selection view, as they place
priming within the process of response selection. For instance, Cohen and
Magen (1999) suggest, on the basis of the response selection model of Cohen
and Shoup (1997), that intertrial priming in visual search results from the
activation of a response. If a stimulus is consistently mapped onto one response,
its occurrence on previous trials will prime that response, leading to a shorter
RT. If the stimulus is not consistently mapped to one response, intertrial priming
is thought not to occur. One version of such a response selection view, stemming
from the task switching literature, suggests that intertrial benefits result mostly
from retrieval of task-relevant episodic memories (Logan, 2002; Neill, 1997;
Waszak et al., 2003). This episodic retrieval account assumes that the translation
from stimulus to response does not occur automatically, but is an effortful
process. During that process, memories of previous occurrences involving
similar stimuli are automatically retrieved. This also means retrieving the
response then given. If the retrieved response matches the one that is now
needed, the response is speeded. When the retrieved response does not match the
one commensurate with the current stimulus, the response is slowed.
Response selection views can explain data such as those of Huang at et al.
(2004). These authors used a search task in which targets always had a size that
differed from all other elements in the display: They could either be smaller or
larger than nontargets. They showed that a repetition of target size was most
beneficial when the required response was the same as that on the previous trial,
and less so when it changed. In the response selection view, if the current target
has the same size as the previous target, but a different response associated with
it, retrieving a representation of the previous trial will not benefit performance
on the current one.
Neither the visual selection view nor the response selection view wholly
accounts for the extant data. A pure visual selection view on priming is difficult
to reconcile with evidence that intertrial priming depends on the responses
required of the participants. For instance, Kumada (2001) found intertrial
priming in a search task when participants determined the presence or absence of
the target (a present/absent task), but no priming in a so-called compound search
task, in which participants were presented with the very same stimuli, but where
the target was always present and responses were to a small arrow presented
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inside it. Since the stimuli had remained identical and only the required response
had changed, Kumada concluded that intertrial priming is response specific.
A response selection view, on the other hand, is difficult to reconcile with the
pervasiveness of intertrial priming in visual search. Many experiments have
shown robust priming effects even in compound search tasks, in which a
response selection view would not expect them (since the response feature is
decoupled from the target feature). Most prominently, Maljkovic and Nakayama
(1994) found intertrial priming with a compound task, as did other researchers
(Goolsby & Suzuki, 2001; Hillstrom, 2000; Olivers & Humphreys, 2003; Pinto,
Olivers, & Theeuwes, in press). Another finding that is difficult to reconcile
with the response selection view is that intertrial priming in the Maljkovic and
Nakayama (1994) type of displays does not occur when participants do not have
to search for the target, for example because a cue shows where the target will
appear, or because the target is the only element in the display (Goolsby &
Suzuki, 2001). Since the response requirements do not change with the elimi-
nation of visual search, a response selection view would not predict that inter-
trial priming disappears in these cases.
The evidence to date thus suggests that intertrial priming in visual search is
not something occurring only in visual selection, or only at response selection.
Neither view offers a comprehensive explanation for when intertrial priming
occurs, or when it does not. In the present paper, we seek to provide and test a
new account that we believe more comprehensively explains the presence or
absence of intertrial priming in visual search.
Before we introduce this account it is instructive to take a closer look at
the studies that did find intertrial priming in a compound task setting (that is,
when the responses were decoupled from the search). What characterizes all
these studies is a certain degree of ambiguity in the stimulus displays. For
instance, in Olivers and Humphreys' (2003) study, the target was not always
the only item in the display carrying a unique feature: On a considerable pro-
portion of trials there was also a so-called singleton distractor present that
interfered with search as indicated by longer RTs. Similarly, Pinto et al. (in
press) found strong intertrial priming effects when the search displays con-
tained a singleton distractor, whereas priming was much reduced or even
absent when there was no distractor. Neither did the target contain a unique
feature in the crucial experiments of Hillstrom's (2000) study. She used dis-
plays in which the target had to be distinguished from either a singleton dis-
tractor or from multiple sets of distractors each of which it shared a feature
with (so called conjunction search). Finally, in Maljkovic and Nakayama's
(1994) original study, the target was unique, but relative to only two dis-
tractors. That is, the target was either a red diamond between two green dia-
monds, or vice versa, a green diamond between two red diamonds. We
suggest that this relatively small distractor/target ratio induced a degree of
ambiguity as to which of the items was the target.
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Based on these observations, we propose that intertrial priming may occur at
any processing step, from attentional selection to response execution, but only
under specific circumstances. In particular, we propose that an important factor
determining whether or not intertrial priming occurs in visual search tasks is the
ambiguity of the task, independent of in which stadium that ambiguity plays out.
If it is ambiguous what the target is, visual selection will rely relatively more on
what was selected in previous trials. If it is ambiguous what the response should
be, response selection will rely more heavily on what response was coupled with
a stimulus on previous trials. Elsewhere, we argue that ambiguity is stronger in
present-absent tasks than in compound search tasks (Olivers & Meeter, in press),
and that therefore intertrial priming is more easily found in the former than in
the latter task. Here, we propose that in the visual selection stage, a display is
ambiguous when multiple elements are plausible targets for visual selection, and
thus are in competition with one another. It is in those cases that the heightened
salience of a repeated target can make a difference. If, on the other hand, there is
little competition in the visual display, the increased salience of a target will not
increase the already high likelihood that the target will be selected, and will
therefore not lead to intertrial priming. We thus propose that it is not the
absolute salience of the target that determines whether intertrial priming occurs,
but whether it is unambiguously the most salient element in the display.
The difference between our account and the visual selection view is that
target selection does not always lead to priming of its features, but only under
ambiguous circumstances. The difference between our account and the response
selection view is that the trace of activation does not lead all the way from
stimulus to response but is specific to the level at which the ambiguity occurs.
At what level does the competition for visual selection occur? We propose
that it is initially at a level where salience is computed in a strictly bottom-up
fashion, such as in a salience map of the kind featuring in some models of
attention (e.g., Navalpakkam & Itti, 2005). In other models top-down target
settings help determine the salience of visual objects (e.g., Bundesen, Habekost,
& Kyllingsbaek, 2005; Muller et al., 1995; Wolfe, Butcher, Lee, & Hyle, 2003),
but as argued above the presence of top-down settings do not seem to influence
the occurrence of intertrial priming (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Theeuwes et
al., in press).1 Moreover, strictly bottom-up competition underlying priming
would help explain why cueing the identity of the upcoming target does not
eliminate intertrial priming (Hillstrom, 2000; MuÈller et al., 2003). Note that this
does not mean that the intertrial priming is due to bottom-up signals alone. It is
possible (and even likely) that the initial ambiguity needs to be resolved with the
aid of top-down signals (e.g., the rejection of a nontarget). These signals will
1 Intertrial priming itself has been identified as a top-down influence on visual search by some
authors. We would argue, however, that the lack of strategic control on priming effects would qualify
it as a bottom-up effect.
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then automatically carry over to the subsequent trial. Our claim is that intertrial
priming is large in search tasks in which bottom-up models of the salience map
predict competition for visual selection (which needs to be resolved), and small
in search tasks in which there is less competition (and hence less need for
ambiguity resolution).
An important factor that increases competition for selection in bottom-up
models of salience is distractor heterogeneity. Our account would thus predict
that heterogeneity increases intertrial priming. Indeed, intertrial priming is found
when a singleton distractor competes with the target for selection (Olivers &
Humphreys, 2003; Pinto et al., in press), when distractors are so few in number
that they do not effectively inhibit one another (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994),
or when the target must be selected from a heterogeneous set of distractors
(Hillstrom, 2000). In contrast, the search displays that failed to yield intertrial
priming (e.g., Kumada, 2001) involved unambiguous unique targets against a
background of many homogenous distractors.
In the present study, we hope to show that ambiguity in target identity, in the
form of competition, may underlie priming in the visual selection stage in
compound tasks. Two experiments will show that factors influencing competi-
tion for visual selection affect the size of intertrial priming, while a control
experiment (Experiment 2) will show that absolute salience per se is not a
determinant of intertrial priming.
EXPERIMENT 1:
SET SIZE AFFECTS INTERTRIAL PRIMING
Although some compound search tasks did not yield any (e.g., Kumada,
2001), the compound search task employed by Maljkovic and Nakayama
(1994, 2000) yielded reliable intertrial priming effects. One salient difference
between their task and those used by others is the number of elements in the
display. Whereas in typical compound search tasks the target is surrounded by
many distractor elements, the target in Maljkovic and Nakayama's studies
was accompanied by just two distractors that were widely spaced across the
display. It is known that in such tasks pop-out may be stronger when there
are many distractor elements in the display, than when there are few (Bravo
& Nakayama, 1992). The more distractors there are, the more unique and
more salient the target becomes relative to these distractors, reducing compe-
tition. Our hypothesis would thus predict that as the number of distractor ele-
ments increases, and the ambiguity is reduced, intertrial priming effects will
also be reduced. This will be investigated in Experiment 1, in which the num-
ber of elements in the display will be varied.
Another difference between the study of Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994)
and others investigating compound search is the task employed. Most compound
search tasks require participants to identify some symbol within the target
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element (e.g., Kumada, 2001; Theeuwes, 1992), whereas Maljkovic and
Nakayama (1994) required participants to detect which corner of a target dia-
mond was cut off. Although we did not expect this difference to affect intertrial
priming, we also compared the task employed by Maljkovic and Nakayama
(1994) with a more typical symbol identification task.
Methods
Participants. Eight observers participated in the experiment for a small
monetary compensation (4 men, 4 women, mean age 23). All had normal or
corrected-to-normal eyesight, and normal colour vision.
Stimuli. Participants were seated in a dimly lit room, at a distance of
approximately 70 cm from a 21-inch monitor. Stimuli were adapted from
Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994). Search screens contained three or twelve
diamonds, one of which was red (CIE x,y chromaticity coordinates 0.597, 0.366,
9.51 cd/m2) while all the others were green (CIE 0.254, 0.649, 12.13 cd/m2), or
vice versa. Stimuli appeared against a black background at either a random three
of twelve equidistant locations, or at all twelve locations, arranged on an
imaginary ellipse of, horizontally, 10 degrees of visual angle, and vertically, 8
degrees of visual angle. Diamonds were 1.1 * 1.1 degrees of visual angle. On
trials in which the task was to detect which corner of a target diamond was cut
off, all diamonds had 0.14 degrees cut off on either the left or the right side (see
Figure 1). On trials in which the task was to identify a symbol inside the
diamonds, each diamond had in it either a left-pointing arrowhead (``<'') or a
right-pointing arrowhead (``>''). The response was chosen randomly at each
trial.
Procedure. Participants were instructed that they would see a number of
diamonds, one with an odd colour, and that they had to identify either the corner
cut off the odd-coloured diamond, or the arrowhead inside it. They were
required to respond to targets with a leftward arrowhead or left cut-off with the
``Z'' key, and to targets with a rightward arrowhead or right cut-off with the
``M'' key.
Trials were organized in eight blocks of 80 trials, preceded by four blocks of
8 practice trials. For each task (arrowheads and corners) two blocks were run
with 3 elements per search screen, and two with 12 elements. Each of the four
practice blocks used a different task and element number combination. Order of
the practice and experimental blocks was randomized (experimental blocks with
the same task and element number combination were always run after another).
Each block contained 40 switch trials, and 40 trials in which the target colour
was repeated. Target colour was random at the start of each block, and then
changed as a function of repetition/switch trials. Trials began with a 500 ms
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presentation of a fixation cross. Then the search display was presented until the
observer responded. Observers were notified when they had made an error, and
given feedback after each block.
Results and discussion
Trials longer than 1500 ms, around 3% of the total, were not analysed. On
average, observers made 6.1% errors, which were excluded from our RT
analyses. We performed an ANOVA to determine whether task variables had
Figure 1. Example of search displays in Experiment 1. Upper panel: Symbols task with 3 elements;
bottom panel: Corners task with 12 elements (in both only the central part of the screen shown).
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effects on error rates (see Table 1). None of the main effects was significant, nor
were any interactions.
On RT, the corners task proved a little easier than the arrowheads task, F(1, 7)
= 29.88, p = .001, MSE = 1256.6 (Figure 2). A larger effect was found for the
number of elements: Locating the target proved easier with twelve elements than
with three elements, F(1, 7) = 54.74, p < .001, MSE = 2284.2. Trials in which
target colour was repeated had shorter latencies than those in which target colour
was changed, F(1, 7) = 39.56, p < .001, MSE = 1236.4. There was no interaction
between the number of elements and the task (corners vs. arrows), F(1, 7) =
1.48, p = .262, MSE = 2809.9, nor were repetition effects dependent on task (F <
1), nor was there a three-way interaction (F < 1). However, and most impor-
Figure 2. Mean RT in Experiment 1, as a function of the number of elements, whether or not the
target colour was repeated or changed from the previous trial, and the task employed.
TABLE 1
Mean error proportions in Experiments 1, 2, and
3, for trials on which the target was the same as
on the previous trial, and on which it was
changed from the previous trial
Target same Feature change
Exp. 1
3 elements .07 .07
12 elements .07 .07
Exp. 2
Large elements .05 .05
Small elements .06 .07
Exp. 3
No distractor .03 .04
Distractor .04 .04
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tantly, repetition effects were larger when there were 3 elements than when there
were 12 elements (85 ms vs. 30 ms, see Figure 2), F(1, 7) = 12.87, p = .009,MSE
= 1006.1. Repetition effects were still significant for the 12 element condition,
though, t(7) = 3.73, p = .007.
We also performed an analysis in which response repetition was taken in as a
factor (i.e., whether or not the same response was elicited on two successive
trials), collapsing over task (Table 2). There was a trend toward an effect of
response repetition, F(1, 7) = 3.64, p = .098, MSE = 143.0, but there were no
interactions of this factor with the number of elements, F(1, 7) = 3.10, p = .121,
MSE = 212.3, or with target repetition (F < 1), nor was there a three-way
interaction (F < 1).
We found that the type of compound task performed by the observers
(responding to corners or arrowheads) did not influence the size of intertrial
priming, but that the number of nontarget elements did (repetition benefits were
85 ms when there were 3 elements in the search display, and only 30 ms for the 12
element displays). Experiment 1 thus shows that reducing competition for visual
selection can influence the strength of intertrial effects. This seems incompatible
with the response selection view. The number of elements in the display does not
change in any way the stimulus±response mappings, and thus should also not
change the effect of retrieving stimulus±response mappings. Instead, the results
are in line with our hypothesis that ambiguity drives intertrial priming: With three
elements, the target is not necessarily more distinctive than distractors, while
with twelve elements, the target clearly pops out of the display.
One confounding factor is that in the condition in which intertrial priming
effects were larger, RTs were also higher. It is possible that higher base RT lead
to stronger intertrial priming, for example if the effects of priming build up
during the time that a display is searched. As a first way to address this alter-
native explanation, we computed the first to fourth quintile in each condition
TABLE 2
Mean RT in Experiments 1 and 3, for trials on which the response was the
same or changed relative to the previous trial, and on which the target was
the same or changed from the previous trial
Response same Response change
Target same Feature change Target same Feature change
Exp. 1
3 elements 843 927 842 927
12 elements 771 808 792 812
Exp. 3
No distractor 705 706 698 703
Distractor 788 818 773 832
AMBIGUITY AND PRIMING 211
(see Figure 3). Priming effects seemed broadly equal in size for the whole RT
distribution. An ANOVA comparing priming effects for the first versus for the
fourth quintile found only a trend towards a greater priming effect at longer RTs:
Interaction between target repetition and quintile, F(1, 7) = 4.17, p = .077, MSE
= 1400.2. There was not even a trend when priming effects were compared for
the second and fourth quintile, F(1, 7) = 2.66, p > .1, MSE = 795.6. It is thus
unlikely that higher RTs can explain the bulk of the increased priming effects in
the three elements condition as compared to the twelve elements condition.
EXPERIMENT 2: EFFECT OF LONGER LATENCIES
Although the quintiles analysis provides a first indication that longer RTs are not
the determining factor for priming effects, we performed a control experiment in
which we varied reaction time, without changing ambiguity. For this purpose we
repeated the crucial conditions of Experiment 1, but in addition manipulated the
size of the elements in the search display. Smaller elements were expected to
lead to longer RTs, without directly affecting the ambiguity of the target±
distractor relationship.
Methods
Participants. Ten observers participated in the experiment for a small
monetary compensation (6 men, 4 women, mean age 23). All had normal or
corrected-to-normal eyesight, and normal colour vision (self-reported).
Figure 3. First, second, and third quartile for the conditions with 3 and 12 elements in Experiment
1, and for trials in which the target colour was repeated vs. where it was changed.
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Stimuli and procedure. Displays were similar to those used in the
arrowhead condition of Experiment 1, except for the size of the diamonds.
These were either smaller or larger (0.72 * 0.72 or 2.2 * 2.2 degrees of visual
angle) than those used in Experiment 1. We varied the number of diamonds as in
Experiment 1 (3 vs. 12), and used the same two colours. Participants were
instructed that they would see a number of diamonds, and that the target
diamond would have a unique colour. Their task was again to identify the
arrowhead inside the target diamond, and to respond with either the ``Z'' key
(``<'') or the ``M'' key (``>'').
Observers were given 32 practice trials, organized in 8-trial blocks with
large or small diamonds. They then went through four blocks, in randomized
order, of 160 trials. In each block one combination of size (large or small)
and number (3 or 12) of elements were used. Again feedback was given
every 80 trials, and observers were immediately notified when they had made
an error.
Results and discussion
Trials longer than 1500 ms, about 1.5% of the total, were not analysed. On
average, observers made 6.0% errors (Table 1), which were excluded from our
RT analyses. ANOVAs did not reveal effects of any variable on error rates.
Figure 4. Mean RT in Experiment 2 as a function of the number of elements in the display, their
size (small or large), and of whether the target colour was repeated or changed from the previous
trial.
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The mean RTs are plotted in Figure 4. As in Experiment 1, search was slower
in the condition with 3 diamonds than in the condition with 12 diamonds, F(1, 9)
= 29.85, p < .001,MSE = 4736.1, and was faster when a target was repeated than
when it was changed, F(1, 9) = 61.17, p < .001,MSE = 758.2. Diamond size also
affected search, with longer RTs for small than for large diamonds, F(1, 9) =
6.18, p = .035, MSE = 4713.4. The number of elements affected intertrial
priming effects: as in Experiment 1, priming was larger in 3 diamond conditions
(mean 68.6 ms) than in 12 diamond conditions (mean 25.5 ms), F(1, 9) = 22.29,
p = .001,MSE = 563.2. However, element size did not interact with target colour
repetition, F(1, 9) < 1. There was no interaction between size and element
number, F(1, 9) = 2.03, p = .19, MSE = 1695.8, and no three-way interaction (F
< 1). Experiment 2 thus shows that a factor that slows search does not neces-
sarily increase the size of intertrial priming, which falsifies the alternative
account of the results of Experiment 1 that baseline RT differences, instead of
ambiguity, explain the effects of element number on intertrial priming.
EXPERIMENT 3: A SINGLETON DISTRACTOR
AFFECTS INTERTRIAL PRIMING
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that ambiguity in target identity is
indeed a factor associated with the occurrence of intertrial priming effects. In
those experiments, ambiguity was related to the number of distractors in the
display, with smaller numbers leading to increased competition. In Experi-
ment 3 we manipulated competition directly by introducing a singleton dis-
tractor, which, like the target, carried a unique colour. Both target and
singleton distractor were highly salient, increasing competition for visual
selection, and thus ambiguity. We should thus find increased priming effects
in this condition compared to a control condition in which no such singleton
distractor is present.
Methods
Participants. Six observers participated in the experiment for a small
monetary compensation (4 men, 2 women, mean age 21). All had normal or
corrected-to-normal eyesight, and normal colour vision (self-reported).
Stimuli and procedure. Displays were similar to those used in the 12-
element arrowhead condition of Experiment 1, except for the colour of the
nontarget diamonds. These were either all 11 grey (no distractor condition), or
consisted of 10 grey nontargets and 1 blue or yellow singleton distractor (blue
CIE x,y chromaticity coordinates 0.165, 0.154, 11.59 cd/m2; and yellow, CIE
0.398, 0.527, 37.34 cd/m2). The colour of the target diamond varied
unpredictably from green to red, as did the singleton distractor colour (from
blue to yellow) in the blocks with colour distractors. Each diamond contained
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either a leftward or a rightward arrowhead. Participants were instructed that they
would see a number of diamonds, that the target diamond would be either green
or red, and that nontarget diamonds would be grey, yellow or blue. Again their
task was to identify the arrowhead inside the target diamond, responding with
the ``Z'' (``<'') or ``M'' keys (``>'').
Observers were given 64 practice trials, organized in 16-trial blocks with or
without singleton distractor. They then went through two blocks, in counter-
balanced order, of which one contained 240 trials with a singleton distractor, the
other 240 trials without a singleton distractor, with feedback given every 80
trials as in the previous experiments (observers were again immediately notified
when they had made an error).
Results and discussion
Trials longer than 1500 ms, less than 1% of the total, were not analysed. On
average, observers made 3.4% errors (Table 1), which were excluded from our
RT analyses. ANOVAs did not reveal effects of any variable on error rates.
Search was slower for trials with a singleton distractor than for those without
one, F(1, 5) = 49.94, p = .001,MSE = 1171.6 (see Figure 5), and was faster when
a target was repeated than when it was changed, F(1, 5) = 10.78, p = .022, MSE
= 266.2. The singleton distractor also affected intertrial priming effects: Priming
was larger when a distractor was present than when it was not, F(1, 5) = 10.80, p
= .022,MSE = 230.7. In fact, there was no effect of target colour repetition in the
no-distractor condition, t(5) < 1. In the distractor-present condition we analysed
the effects of target colour repetition and singleton distractor colour repetition.
Repetition of target colour speeded RT by about 40 ms, F(1, 5) = 12.68, p =
Figure 5. Mean RT in Experiment 3 as a function of whether or not a singleton distractor was
present in the display, whether the target colour was repeated or changed from the previous trial.
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.016, MSE = 851.1, while repetition of distractor colour speeded RT by about 10
ms, F(1, 5) = 24.72, p = .004, MSE = 22.4. There was no interaction between the
two factors (F < 1).
The results show that intertrial priming is modulated by the presence of a
singleton distractor, as predicted by our hypothesis that the presence of a
singleton distractor increases competition and thus ambiguity in the display.
Note though that overall the intertrial priming effects were smaller than in
Experiment 1. In the no singleton distractor condition they were even absent,
although on the surface this condition seems similar to the 12 element condi-
tions of Experiments 1 and 2, in which 30 and 25 ms priming effects were
found. This difference is likely due to the fact that in Experiment 3 the colour
of the nontarget elements was always grey (except for the singleton dis-
tractor), whereas in Experiment 1 the target and nontargets switched colour
(i.e., on switch trials a red target among green nontargets was followed by a
green target among red nontargets). Boosting the salience of the target colour
increases nontarget salience if target and nontarget colours switch, leading to
stronger competition. This may explain why priming was found in the 12 ele-
ment condition of Experiment 1, and not in the no distractor condition of
Experiment 3.
A similar factor may also explain the results of Hillstrom (2000). In her
Experiment 3 a singleton distractor was added to the display. Contrary to our
results, she failed to find any increase in priming effects as compared to a
condition without such singleton distractor in her Experiment 1. However, just
like in our experiments, the nontarget colour remained constant in the singleton
condition, whereas targets and nontargets exchanged colour in the nonsingleton
condition. Thus, in Hillstrom's experiments, the colour switch may have
increased priming to a similar extent as adding a singleton distractor does. This
factor may thus explain why Hillstrom did not find an effect of an added
singleton distractor, while we did.
We also analysed the effect of response repetitionÐwhether or not the
response on two following trials was the sameÐon reaction time. For trials
without a distractor, there was no effect of response repetition (F < 1), nor was
there an interaction with target repetition (F < 1). For trials on which a distractor
was present, no main effect of response repetition was found (F < 1). However,
there was an interaction between target and response repetition: Target repeti-
tion had a larger effect when responses were repeated (59 ms) than when they
were not (30 ms), F(1, 5) = 11.44, p = .02, MSE = 456.8. As predicted by the
response selection view of priming, intertrial priming is thus especially strong
when both the stimulus and the required response remain the same from one trial
to the next. Contrary to the response selection view, however, repetition of the
target stimulus was beneficial both when the response did and did not remain the
same, as evidenced by a main effect of target repetition, F(1, 5) = 14,26, p =
.013, MSE = 464.0.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The experiments presented here show that intertrial priming in visual search is by
no means an immutable phenomenon. Experiment 1 showed that intertrial
priming is influenced by the number of elements that observers have to search:
Large effects were found when the search display contained just three elements,
increasing competition for selection. Much smaller intertrial priming effects were
found with twelve element displays, when target identity was less ambiguous. The
main finding of Experiment 3 was that the presence of a singleton distractor
modulated the intertrial priming. In the no singleton distractor condition of
Experiment 3 no intertrial priming was found, whereas a substantial priming
effect was present when a singleton distractor was included in the displays.
Findings from both experiments are in line with the ambiguity resolution
hypothesis set out at the beginning of this paper; an increase in the ambiguity of
target identity increased intertrial priming effects in both experiments. They are
not consistent with pure response selection views of intertrial priming. Our
findings show that changes in the stimulus can substantially affect intertrial
priming even when the response requirements remain the same. This goes
against views in which intertrial priming only results from faster selection of the
correct response when the target is repeated.
Our findings are also not consistent with pure visual selection views of
intertrial priming. These views state that selecting a target results in its defining
features (or dimensions) being more activated, efficiently allowing for repeated
selection. However, since these accounts focus on the activation of target
properties, they do not straightforwardly predict the influence of other display
properties such as the set size or the presence of a singleton distractor. More-
over, from the literature, it is clear that response factors also mediate intertrial
priming (Huang et al., 2004; Kumada, 2001; Olivers & Meeter, in press). This is
confirmed by our finding in Experiment 3 that benefits of a repeated target were
larger when the required response was also repeated.
It thus seems that intertrial priming can occur at any processing step, from
attentional selection to response execution. It does not invariably occur, as
failings to observe intertrial priming reported in the literature (Kumada, 2001)
and in our Experiment 3 have shown. We have proposed ambiguity as a factor
determining whether or not intertrial priming occurs in visual search. If it is
ambiguous what the required response is, response selection will rely more
heavily on what response was coupled with a stimulus on previous trials. If it is
ambiguous what the target is, visual selection is helped by the increasing
salience of target features of the previous trials, as found in electrophysiological
recordings (Bichot & Schall, 2002). In the experiments reported here, ambiguity
took the form of increased competition for visual selection.
Although in the discussion above we suggested that target features may gain
a competitive advantage, it might be more correct to say that the target as a
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whole becomes more salient. Findings from Huang et al. (2004) suggest that in
the representations underlying priming, all features of the target are bound
together. They varied target identity on three dimensions: Colour, size, and
orientation (with the latter being the response feature). Intertrial priming was
large when all target dimensions were repeated, but when one feature changed,
repetition of the other features could even have a detrimental effect. This sug-
gests that the representations involved are at the level of so-called object files,
storing integrated objects (Treisman, 1992). Also consistent with this is the fact
that intertrial priming driven by target identity is not dependent on the target
appearing twice at the same location (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994).2
Goolsby and Suzuki (2001) showed that it is not necessary for the participant
to search for the target during the previous trial for intertrial priming to occur.
They used the paradigm of Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994) with three dia-
monds, of which one was the target by virtue of its unique colour. On some
trials, they cued the target position. Such trials, on which no search was
necessary, still evoked intertrial priming: After a trial in which a spatial cue
revealed target position, reactions were still speeded on a subsequent search trial
if the target had the same colour (as mentioned earlier, there was no intertrial
priming on the trials in which the target was cued). However, intertrial priming
only occurred when the target element was attended: When a distractor element
was cued (i.e., an element that was not a colour singleton), no intertrial priming
was found. This suggests that the target must be attended, and the task must
remain constant.
Alternative episodic theories
The results reported here are inconsistent with a view in which priming results
solely from episodic retrieval of responses. They are more consistent with two
other episodic views on priming. In both, retrieval of episodic memories from
previous trials is thought to aid processing, but at different stages than response
selection. Hillstrom (2000) suggested that retrieval of previous trials has an
influence on the prioritization rules underlying visual selection. By retrieving
previous targets, participants would reestablish the prioritization settings that led
to the finding of these targets. However, note that this idea is very difficult to
distinguish from a visual selection view, in which the prioritization settings are
more directly altered by the preceding trial. Moreover Hillstrom's proposal does
not explicitly include a role for ambiguity.
Another episodic retrieval account has focused on a different processing step.
According to Huang et al. (2004), participants will, after selecting the target,
2 Our point is not that a repetition of target location or of the visual configuration cannot deliver
benefits, as it has been demonstrated that they can (Chun & Jiang, 1998; Chun & Nakayama, 2000;
Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1996), but only that the benefits of target repetition are independent of those
that accrue from position repetition (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1996).
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experience insecurity about whether they have selected the right element. They
will therefore engage in a ``checking'' process to ascertain that the element they
have selected is indeed the target. Retrieval of previous trials will help in this
process, as a memory of the previous target will help the participant ascertain
that the currently selected element is indeed a target. This is a plausible account
of priming in their task, in which targets could be either smaller or larger than
nontarget elements, but always matched memories from previous targets. In the
basic Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994) paradigm (the three element condition in
our Experiment 1), however, it is difficult to see how a checking procedure
focused on the target could help participants. Only its status as a colour singleton
defines the target as a target; only a procedure centred on the whole display can
thus ascertain that the target is indeed the target. This is not what Huang et al.
propose, however: The checking procedure is based on a comparison of the
target alone with target memories (a ``rechecking'' of the whole display would
come down to selecting the target for a second time, and would not benefit from
memories of previous trials).
Alternative search-oriented theories
The addition of a singleton distractor, as in Experiment 3, has been hypothesized
to change the nature of the search process. When the target is not unique in its
uniqueness, observers may switch from singleton detection mode to feature
detection mode (Bacon & Egeth, 1994), or from diffuse attention to more
focused attention (Bravo & Nakayama, 1992). Bacon and Egeth surmise that
observers in singleton detection mode will select any singleton in the display.
When this strategy does not yield the target in a sufficient number of trials,
observers will explicitly search for the feature defining the target, and thus
disregard singletons that do not match the singleton definition. Bravo and
Nakayama state that observers will look for feature discontinuities when there is
only one singleton, widely distributing attention across the display. Although
Bravo and Nakayama do not discuss the case that there is more than one feature
singleton, they suggest that observers can restrict their attention to part of the
display in order to exclude interfering information. In this case, feature dis-
continuities are less easy to observe, and therefore the specific feature values of
the target will play a greater role in visual search (Bravo & Nakayama, 1992).
One could imagine that these changes in the character of the search underlie
the presence or absence of intertrial priming. Intertrial priming in visual search
may only occur, for example, when the task induces participants to divide their
attention over the whole display and not focus closely on the target. This
hypothesis, that unfocused attention is required for intertrial priming to occur,
was in fact proposed by Kumada (2001). However, he rejected it because he did
not find intertrial priming in a texture comparison task that did not require
focused attention. Moreover, such a hypothesis would also be at odds with our
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result in Experiment 3 that intertrial priming is present for displays with a salient
singleton distractor, but absent for displays without one.
Alternatively, intertrial priming may depend on the search mode used: It may
be present for feature search mode, and absent for singleton detection mode.
Although such a hypothesis would explain the results of Experiment 3, it would
not elucidate findings from Experiment 1. It is not, a priori, clear why partici-
pants would use feature search in that experiment, as no feature predicted what
the target would be. It thus seems to be impossible to identify a type of visual
search that accommodates intertrial priming, to the exclusion of other types of
search.
Conclusion
We have shown that manipulations affecting search can influence the presence
and size of intertrial priming effects. We have also presented a new hypothesis
that attempts to explain when priming occurs and when it does not. Whether or
not our hypothesis covers all the facts, we hope to have established that a theory
of intertrial priming must not only explain that it occurs, but also why it
sometimes does and sometimes does not occur.
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